Corruption in Jordan

Solutions to a Rising Problem of Public Confidence Still Elude Officials

Abu Mahjoob

Corruption used to be a subtext in Jordan. It lurked just below the surface of mild discontent (or apathy) over politics and business--and more often in the murky intersection of the two. It was a quiet but persistent rumor among casual observers and political analysts alike. But its rise as something of a hot-button issue in the last two years may be a sign that forces within civil society, the media, and perhaps even government itself are no longer willing to tolerate the problem as a fact of life. Unfortunately, however, mechanisms of correction still lag well behind the issue’s increasing visibility.

Writing in March of this year, Foreign Affairs Middle East and Jordan analyst Marc Lynch remarked,

“It's hard to avoid the subject of corruption when you talk to people in Jordan. During my last few visits there, no matter how much I tried to talk about the Muslim Brotherhood or the Parliament or constitutional reform, talk would always eventually come around to dark whispers about the rising tide of corruption at the highest levels.”

And it has become a dark cloud surrounding the government of Prime Minister Samir al Rifai. There is no doubt that the Rifai government has played host to a number of prominent corruption investigations during its tenure. Embezzlement schemes were broken up at the Ministry of Agriculture and Greater Amman Municipality, and a shady privatization process was uncovered in majority-state-owned Jordan Petroleum and Refinement Company. In all three, mid-to-high level bureaucrats are under indictment for fraud and abuse of office.

But to be fair, growing perceptions of the current government’s inability to root out these kinds of fraud are heavily influenced by corruption cases it simply inherited. Take the Decent Housing Initiative scandal of 2009, for example. The son of former the Public Housing and Works Minister Abdel Hadi al Majali oversaw an abridged tender window (of only 25 days) to privilege the bid of his own company to build affordable housing for the poor. Although Sahel al Majali’s semi-public entity was eventually scrapped, his company and its managers had already collected upwards of 1 million JD from the royal initiative. 

Allegations surrounding royal insider Bassem Awadallah in 2008 eventually forced his resignation. A company with family and/or financial ties to Awadallah had lured foreign workers from Nepal only to send them to work in Iraq as contractors (in an illegal breach of contract). Then, of course, there is always the issue of a huge wave of suspect government land sales to the private sector in recent years.

On occasions to address these issues publicly, King Abdullah has unfortunately downplayed their significance--while still pledging to root out corruption wherever the government finds it. In a speech this summer commemorating the eleventh anniversary of his ascension to the throne, the King called rumors of corruption and nepotism in the highest offices “slightly exaggerated and overblown.” 

The King is apt to defend government land sales in the context of Jordan’s high availability of public land (around 80%) and as part of a plan to pay off the Kingdom’s foreign debt. What he neglects to mention is that most of that 80% lies in vast stretches of undeveloped desert and that land sales used to pay down government debt may nevertheless be ‘steals’ for private investors (many of them foreign). Instead, King Abdullah brushes aside these accusations with the same confidence with which he dispels the grumbling over corruption: “Some are painting government sale of its assets in a non-reversible doom and gloom scenario,” whereas from the King's point of view the state has both the unquestioned right to sell land and the best interests of the public at stake.

To his credit, Prime Minister Rifai responded early in his term by launching an anti-corruption campaign, calling it “the state’s number one enemy.” Rifai started with himself. He stepped down as CEO of Jordan Dubai Capital, instructing the firm to withdraw tenders associated with his period of company leadership. It was an important move, considering JD Capital’s subsidiaries were involved in everything from the Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company expansion to an alternative energy consortium within the Kingdom to the high-profile Abdali redevelopment project. But his wider campaign had the veneer of a publicity stunt, and self-imposed corrections to the problem---such issuing an unenforceable "Code of Conduct"--have fallen well short of restoring public confidence. 

More importantly, institutional obstacles to transparency remain perhaps the biggest challenge to fighting instances--and perceptions--of corruption in the Kingdom. Without access to evidence to evaluate whether government bodies and public-private dealings are fair of fraudulent, many in the public and the media simply assume the worst. Moreover, government entities like the Anti-Corruption Commission possess the mandate but lack the power and resources to independently pursue cases; the four-year old body already has such a large backlog of cases that its ability to open new investigations is questionable. Legislative oversight when parliament was in session simply lacked the necessary teeth; a committee set up to look into corruption allegations chose to limited itself to a body of inquiry, not of formal investigation.


The disconnect between rhetoric and results has left some observers wondering:

“How can any government take corruption seriously simply by signing a document it wrote up itself, and making several speeches? Fighting corruption requires setting up automatic mechanisms that are here to stay, usually in the form of independent entities that have both the power and the authority to deal with corruption no matter who is involved. Be it a minister or an employee.” [source]

Normally the press would serve as an institutional backup in the battle against corruption, but 

journalists in Jordan face a recurring battle for access to information from government sources--despite the fact that the Anti-Corruption Commission publicly welcomed the role of the media as a watchdog. The right to information is nominally guaranteed in the Press and Publications Law, the Constitution, and the National Charter, but in reality journalists often encounter brick walls from ministries and silence from government officials.  Rarely, if ever, is the action taken to court to guarantee access.

Writing on 7iber in 2008, Lina Ejeilat conceded that, “as a journalist, I often find that access to information (or lack thereof) is one of the main hurdles that prevent me from doing my work.” In a striking example of active efforts by the government to hinder access to information, in late February 2008 Ammon News broke the story of an internal memo from Prime Minister Nader Dhahabi instructing ministries and government institutions to withhold documents concerning administrative and financial abuses from journalists. And in March of 2009, a government court judge blocked the release of any details of ongoing corruption cases to the local media without its prior approval. It is unclear how much of a break Rifai has/has not made with his predecessors on this issue.

One would do well to keep in mind, though, that the question of corruption in Jordan is also intimately tied to long-standing patronage networks, the “‘mini’ corruption” of wasta, and tribalism. It may be as much the fault of an apathetic electorate on the take as government impotency or inaction. This is not to say that corruption is endemic culturally, but it may be inextricable from a political system that still privileges tribal and business ties in both elections and administration.

As esteemed Ad Dustour columnist (and former blogger) Batir Wardum noted:

“I am afraid to say that a big part of the responsibility is attributed to the public’s attitude towards corruption...If a corruption case is in favor of a segment (group, company, tribe) they will support it but once the same behaviour is against them they will wage verbal war on corruption. How many officials (ministers, secretary generals, etc..) where labelled as “strong”, ‘confident” and ’successful” by their public supporters when they favour them in jobs and other outcomes? How many officials were labelled as ‘weak” and “fragile” for being honest? In fact, corrupt officials usually turn out to receive honors and get recycled in new and higher positions.”

Wardum’s word of caution was fairly prescient. Remember Sahel al Majali--son of the former Public Housing and Works Minister at the center of the Decent Housing Initiative storm? He was recycled into the administration as Transportation Minister overseeing--among other things--the tender process for a multi-billion JD plan to expand Jordan’s railway system.

Tolerance for institutionalized corruption only diminishes as cases that do manage to become publicized ricochet around the online news websites and Jordanian blogosphere, of course. For the Rifai government, persistent public outrage on the issue more recently should be a clear signal that many Jordanians have become fed up. But perceptions of corruption not only reflect better vetting by the press. There are also clear signs that the corruption problem, from some external measures, was getting worse by the end of 2009 when Rifai came to power.

Global Integrity

Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) shows no improvement, and in fact a slight increase (downgraded from 5.1 to 5 on a 0-10 scale), in Jordanians’ perceptions of corruption within the Kingdom. Global Integrity ranks Jordan as “very weak” (55 out of 100) in its efforts to combat corruption, and notes a disturbing gap between recent strengthening of the legal framework and actual implementation/enforcement of policies. GI also underscores the problem of public access to information as a key hurdle:

“In practice, however, citizen access to key documents such as asset disclosure forms submitted by government officials, financial records of state-owned companies, and reports from both the anti-corruption commission and the ombudsman's office is limited.”

International measures of corruption not only suggest just how far the Rifai government still has to go in really tackling this issue, but they are also likely to dampen the mood of the very private investors and foreign direct investment that both King and cabinet are counting on to jump-start a stalled economy.


Public opinion polling inside the Kingdom only emphasizes the extent to which Rifai's early action on the issue of corruption has failed to convince the populace. A Center for Strategic Studies poll(.doc) conducted in July shows that less than half of Jordanians believe the government has done enough to achieve transparency in official appointments and combat forms of corruption, nepotism and cronyism in the public sector.

Despite its rising prominence in media reports and public awareness, corruption is unlikely to coalesce into a campaign issue in the November parliamentary elections. Candidates who may espouse popular notions of working to fight official corruption are just as likely to ignore the issue once in office so they can fly below the radar and garner kickbacks for their own districts. A long-term solution to the problem has less to do with empowering cabinet-level oversight bodies and more to do with restructuring the political system, so that platform-based parties with a vested interest in tackling official fraud are not only electable but given a sufficient mandate in parliament vis-a-vis the government.

With a new election law instituting essentially the same political system that bred the last ineffective and corrupt parliament--and no restructuring of the executive-legislative relationship foreseeable in the near future--the responsibility to check government excess in the meantime will continue to fall to an equally-circumscribed media.


How the King can parry international criticism of corruption in the Kingdom, and how his government can mute a growing tide of domestic discontent over the issue, remains to be seen.