Corruption in Jordan

Solutions to a Rising Problem of Public Confidence Still Elude Officials

Abu Mahjoob

Corruption used to be a subtext in Jordan. It lurked just below the surface of mild discontent (or apathy) over politics and business--and more often in the murky intersection of the two. It was a quiet but persistent rumor among casual observers and political analysts alike. But its rise as something of a hot-button issue in the last two years may be a sign that forces within civil society, the media, and perhaps even government itself are no longer willing to tolerate the problem as a fact of life. Unfortunately, however, mechanisms of correction still lag well behind the issue’s increasing visibility.

Writing in March of this year, Foreign Affairs Middle East and Jordan analyst Marc Lynch remarked,

“It's hard to avoid the subject of corruption when you talk to people in Jordan. During my last few visits there, no matter how much I tried to talk about the Muslim Brotherhood or the Parliament or constitutional reform, talk would always eventually come around to dark whispers about the rising tide of corruption at the highest levels.”

And it has become a dark cloud surrounding the government of Prime Minister Samir al Rifai. There is no doubt that the Rifai government has played host to a number of prominent corruption investigations during its tenure. Embezzlement schemes were broken up at the Ministry of Agriculture and Greater Amman Municipality, and a shady privatization process was uncovered in majority-state-owned Jordan Petroleum and Refinement Company. In all three, mid-to-high level bureaucrats are under indictment for fraud and abuse of office.

But to be fair, growing perceptions of the current government’s inability to root out these kinds of fraud are heavily influenced by corruption cases it simply inherited. Take the Decent Housing Initiative scandal of 2009, for example. The son of former the Public Housing and Works Minister Abdel Hadi al Majali oversaw an abridged tender window (of only 25 days) to privilege the bid of his own company to build affordable housing for the poor. Although Sahel al Majali’s semi-public entity was eventually scrapped, his company and its managers had already collected upwards of 1 million JD from the royal initiative. 

Allegations surrounding royal insider Bassem Awadallah in 2008 eventually forced his resignation. A company with family and/or financial ties to Awadallah had lured foreign workers from Nepal only to send them to work in Iraq as contractors (in an illegal breach of contract). Then, of course, there is always the issue of a huge wave of suspect government land sales to the private sector in recent years.

On occasions to address these issues publicly, King Abdullah has unfortunately downplayed their significance--while still pledging to root out corruption wherever the government finds it. In a speech this summer commemorating the eleventh anniversary of his ascension to the throne, the King called rumors of corruption and nepotism in the highest offices “slightly exaggerated and overblown.” 

The King is apt to defend government land sales in the context of Jordan’s high availability of public land (around 80%) and as part of a plan to pay off the Kingdom’s foreign debt. What he neglects to mention is that most of that 80% lies in vast stretches of undeveloped desert and that land sales used to pay down government debt may nevertheless be ‘steals’ for private investors (many of them foreign). Instead, King Abdullah brushes aside these accusations with the same confidence with which he dispels the grumbling over corruption: “Some are painting government sale of its assets in a non-reversible doom and gloom scenario,” whereas from the King's point of view the state has both the unquestioned right to sell land and the best interests of the public at stake.

To his credit, Prime Minister Rifai responded early in his term by launching an anti-corruption campaign, calling it “the state’s number one enemy.” Rifai started with himself. He stepped down as CEO of Jordan Dubai Capital, instructing the firm to withdraw tenders associated with his period of company leadership. It was an important move, considering JD Capital’s subsidiaries were involved in everything from the Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company expansion to an alternative energy consortium within the Kingdom to the high-profile Abdali redevelopment project. But his wider campaign had the veneer of a publicity stunt, and self-imposed corrections to the problem---such issuing an unenforceable "Code of Conduct"--have fallen well short of restoring public confidence. 

More importantly, institutional obstacles to transparency remain perhaps the biggest challenge to fighting instances--and perceptions--of corruption in the Kingdom. Without access to evidence to evaluate whether government bodies and public-private dealings are fair of fraudulent, many in the public and the media simply assume the worst. Moreover, government entities like the Anti-Corruption Commission possess the mandate but lack the power and resources to independently pursue cases; the four-year old body already has such a large backlog of cases that its ability to open new investigations is questionable. Legislative oversight when parliament was in session simply lacked the necessary teeth; a committee set up to look into corruption allegations chose to limited itself to a body of inquiry, not of formal investigation.


The disconnect between rhetoric and results has left some observers wondering:

“How can any government take corruption seriously simply by signing a document it wrote up itself, and making several speeches? Fighting corruption requires setting up automatic mechanisms that are here to stay, usually in the form of independent entities that have both the power and the authority to deal with corruption no matter who is involved. Be it a minister or an employee.” [source]

Normally the press would serve as an institutional backup in the battle against corruption, but 

journalists in Jordan face a recurring battle for access to information from government sources--despite the fact that the Anti-Corruption Commission publicly welcomed the role of the media as a watchdog. The right to information is nominally guaranteed in the Press and Publications Law, the Constitution, and the National Charter, but in reality journalists often encounter brick walls from ministries and silence from government officials.  Rarely, if ever, is the action taken to court to guarantee access.

Writing on 7iber in 2008, Lina Ejeilat conceded that, “as a journalist, I often find that access to information (or lack thereof) is one of the main hurdles that prevent me from doing my work.” In a striking example of active efforts by the government to hinder access to information, in late February 2008 Ammon News broke the story of an internal memo from Prime Minister Nader Dhahabi instructing ministries and government institutions to withhold documents concerning administrative and financial abuses from journalists. And in March of 2009, a government court judge blocked the release of any details of ongoing corruption cases to the local media without its prior approval. It is unclear how much of a break Rifai has/has not made with his predecessors on this issue.

One would do well to keep in mind, though, that the question of corruption in Jordan is also intimately tied to long-standing patronage networks, the “‘mini’ corruption” of wasta, and tribalism. It may be as much the fault of an apathetic electorate on the take as government impotency or inaction. This is not to say that corruption is endemic culturally, but it may be inextricable from a political system that still privileges tribal and business ties in both elections and administration.

As esteemed Ad Dustour columnist (and former blogger) Batir Wardum noted:

“I am afraid to say that a big part of the responsibility is attributed to the public’s attitude towards corruption...If a corruption case is in favor of a segment (group, company, tribe) they will support it but once the same behaviour is against them they will wage verbal war on corruption. How many officials (ministers, secretary generals, etc..) where labelled as “strong”, ‘confident” and ’successful” by their public supporters when they favour them in jobs and other outcomes? How many officials were labelled as ‘weak” and “fragile” for being honest? In fact, corrupt officials usually turn out to receive honors and get recycled in new and higher positions.”

Wardum’s word of caution was fairly prescient. Remember Sahel al Majali--son of the former Public Housing and Works Minister at the center of the Decent Housing Initiative storm? He was recycled into the administration as Transportation Minister overseeing--among other things--the tender process for a multi-billion JD plan to expand Jordan’s railway system.

Tolerance for institutionalized corruption only diminishes as cases that do manage to become publicized ricochet around the online news websites and Jordanian blogosphere, of course. For the Rifai government, persistent public outrage on the issue more recently should be a clear signal that many Jordanians have become fed up. But perceptions of corruption not only reflect better vetting by the press. There are also clear signs that the corruption problem, from some external measures, was getting worse by the end of 2009 when Rifai came to power.

Global Integrity

Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) shows no improvement, and in fact a slight increase (downgraded from 5.1 to 5 on a 0-10 scale), in Jordanians’ perceptions of corruption within the Kingdom. Global Integrity ranks Jordan as “very weak” (55 out of 100) in its efforts to combat corruption, and notes a disturbing gap between recent strengthening of the legal framework and actual implementation/enforcement of policies. GI also underscores the problem of public access to information as a key hurdle:

“In practice, however, citizen access to key documents such as asset disclosure forms submitted by government officials, financial records of state-owned companies, and reports from both the anti-corruption commission and the ombudsman's office is limited.”

International measures of corruption not only suggest just how far the Rifai government still has to go in really tackling this issue, but they are also likely to dampen the mood of the very private investors and foreign direct investment that both King and cabinet are counting on to jump-start a stalled economy.


Public opinion polling inside the Kingdom only emphasizes the extent to which Rifai's early action on the issue of corruption has failed to convince the populace. A Center for Strategic Studies poll(.doc) conducted in July shows that less than half of Jordanians believe the government has done enough to achieve transparency in official appointments and combat forms of corruption, nepotism and cronyism in the public sector.

Despite its rising prominence in media reports and public awareness, corruption is unlikely to coalesce into a campaign issue in the November parliamentary elections. Candidates who may espouse popular notions of working to fight official corruption are just as likely to ignore the issue once in office so they can fly below the radar and garner kickbacks for their own districts. A long-term solution to the problem has less to do with empowering cabinet-level oversight bodies and more to do with restructuring the political system, so that platform-based parties with a vested interest in tackling official fraud are not only electable but given a sufficient mandate in parliament vis-a-vis the government.

With a new election law instituting essentially the same political system that bred the last ineffective and corrupt parliament--and no restructuring of the executive-legislative relationship foreseeable in the near future--the responsibility to check government excess in the meantime will continue to fall to an equally-circumscribed media.


How the King can parry international criticism of corruption in the Kingdom, and how his government can mute a growing tide of domestic discontent over the issue, remains to be seen.

The Challenge from the Right

Petitions, counter-petitions, and regime legitimacy

Traditionally, the King and his cabinet have benefitted politically from the unwavering support of self-described ‘East Bank’ Jordanians. In a country where the politics of identity carries with it both the heavy burden of history and implications in day-to-day governance, the regime has long been able to count on rural and tribal supporters as well as the institutional backing of the armed forces--particularly at key moments like the events of Black September, the succession of the throne, or the 1994 peace treaty with Israel. 

Black September, 1970

The regime has, in turn, distributed patronage among these groups through overrepresentation in parliament and empowerment in key royal court, administrative, and cabinet-level posts. Jordan’s East Bank voices have therefore tended to contrast with advocates for political reform among the urban (and predominantly Palestinian) population, who--although by no means a monolithic group--have responded to marginalization in the state and military apparatuses and political underrepresentation largely by pursuing economic power in the private sector.

Recent developments, however, make it increasingly clear that the government’s neo-liberal economic reform agenda and political missteps are straining the regime’s relationship with its East Bank stalwarts. To stay afloat amidst a global economic downturn and the burden of a large public debt, the regime has sought to trim the public sector, reduce government subsidies on commodities like diesel and heating oil, and encourage private enterprise. Government officials have faced unprecedented criticism, however, because these moves are perceived to come at the expense of rural Jordanians and status quo voices within the bureaucracy. They also feed into a longstanding demographic debate within the Kingdom.

In May, an influential group of retired army officers penned an open letter to the King calling on the regime to institutionalize limits on the political rights of Palestinian refugees in the Kingdom, rethink its relationship with Israel, strengthen the power of the parliament, and root out corruption.

The critique is novel in its frankness and in that it was levied by traditional allies of the King, the Transjordanian military establishment; there is also little doubt that the National Committee of Retired Servicemen (NCRS) represents a significant climate of opinion in the active-duty Jordanian officer corps as well. As Robert Fisk writes in The Independent, 

"[Their] voice is not to be taken lightly by King Abdullah of Jordan and his government. These are the king's men. But they are fierce nationalists."

But while It may be tempting to frame the letter’s demands in purely demographic terms--such as the authors’ troubling assertion that the levers of legislative and judicial power are now in Palestinian hands--the frustrations voiced in the petition represent a more nuanced and overlapping web of identity politics and political/economic discontent. 

Alongside a critique of regime policies (allegedly the result of US and Israeli pressure) that risk “liquidating the Palestinian issue at the expense of Jordan,” for example, the petition also links the political impotence of the government to the “emergence and establishment of certain centers of powers and ruling families” that have come to monopolize decision-making.

And at its heart, the letter stakes a bold claim for political reform and transparency. Such demands are not unique to the NCRS, but come in the context of upcoming parliamentary elections still marred by the memory of fraud and vote-buying from the last round in 2007, allegations of influence-peddling and nepotism in ministerial appointments under the Rifai government, and corruption in government contracts and land sales. Against this backdrop, the officers boldly assert that, 

"No one has a claim to power through kinship or title. The King rules with a general mandate and with the trust of parliament, which is elected fairly to represent the governorates on the basis of geography and not of population. Governments should be formed to represent the people and not to represent centers of influence, prominent families, or the business elite."

Yet these seemingly progressive demands for reform from a traditionally-conservative bloc are inextricably tied to issues of identity in Jordan. The emphasis on a parliament that represents governorates “on the basis of geography and not of population” is a not-so-subtle jab at the quasi-proportional weight given to the urban centers of Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa under a new election law. The vague reference to “certain centers of power and ruling families” indirectly implicates influential and wealthy Palestinian families, particularly those centered in and around Amman.

"Economic investment policies are destroying the country”

As de facto spokesmen for rural and tribal constituencies, the retired officers also abhor recent economic reforms. Many policies enacted by the government of Prime Minister Samir Rifai have sought to privatize state-controlled industries, cut government expenditures, attract private (and often foreign) investment in urban zones, and strengthen the business climate in the Kingdom. The response from the concerned officers is something of a populist warning against the unchecked excesses of capitalism:

"Policies of privatization, the sale of the public sector, and the growing control of business with its corruption and dubious investments have led to inflation, public debt, a bankrupt economy, and the prevalence of poverty, hunger, and unemployment--especially among Jordan’s children."

But the fact that the very private sector in question has long been dominated by Palestinians will certainly not be lost on any Jordanian reading the petition. The implication is that acceding to internal and external pressures to empower the Palestinian majority within Jordan (whether politically or economically) is not only threatening the core identity of the country, but is undermining its economic and social foundations. The officers therefore call on the regime to:

"Launch an anti-corruption campaign, return key segments to the public sector, impose a progressive taxation system to achieve social justice, and embark on national development policies founded on the priority of rural and desert areas of the Kingdom."

By far the most controversial proposal in the petition, however, is its call to constitutionalize Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank (enacted by royal decree by King Hussein in 1988, more than two decades after Jordanian forces were pushed east of the River Jordan by Israel). Doing so would enable Jordan to ‘deal’ with its Palestinian population of some 3.5 million in one of two ways: for those legally able to return to the West Bank, the state should push them to obtain Palestinian citizenship and travel documents to facilitate their speedy exit from the Kingdom; for those unable to return to Israel proper, enforcement of UN Resolution 194 (‘the right of return’) should be a inalienable cornerstone of Jordanian foreign policy--though not through a peace treaty the officers view as entirely one-sided.

Allies of the Right

Although perhaps less patently anti-Palestinian than the NCRS and many within the heavily-Transjordanian ranks of the active officer corps, a number of other political and associational groups have added their voices to those of the petitioners. A conglomeration of union leaders, bureaucrats, and rural elites have loosely endorsed the letter’s central message: recent economic and political policies are threatening the very character and stability of the Jordanian state. As a unionist in Fisk’s piece puts it,

"Although this started as social demands, it became a larger movement of discontent. You'd be surprised how widely these views are felt – bus drivers, cigarette sellers, pharmacists, they're all part of a Transjordanian movement."

Indeed; in an odd twist of fate, the NCRS has thrown its support behind a boycott of the parliamentary elections in November. In a perfect example of the maxim “politics makes strange bedfellows,” other boycott supporters include the political wing of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood--the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the centrist National Constitutional party, the liberal democratic Jordan National Movement, and even the leftist Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity party.

IAF (Foreign Policy)

Although nearly all of Jordan’s political parties are weak and constitute small players in an electoral system still dominated by incumbency and personal, business, and tribal ties, the IAF is a significant and credible opposition voice in the Kingdom. Thus It is particularly noteworthy (ironic?) that the NCRS should stand side-by-side with the IAF in calls for a boycott. Whereas the IAF advocates a boycott based on its previous experiences of electoral disenfranchisement (much to the delight of many Transjordanian nationalists) and its assessment that the new election law does not go far enough in redressing the underrepresentation of urban Palestinian districts, the NCRS opposes the new election law for adding parliamentary seats in these urban centers at the expense of its rural and tribal East Bank constituencies.

The Not-quite-pro-regime Response

Not to be outdone, a more representative coalition of both the East Bank and Palestinian elite (including many influential political leaders) signed on to a counter-petition from former head of the security apparatus (GID) and former Prime Minister Ahmed Obeidat refuting the identity-based arguments of the NCRS. Assuming the name of “Chapter 7” in a clear reference to the section of Jordan’s National Charter affirming the “special and distinctive character” of the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship, the authors defend the current balance of identities and interests in the Kingdom by basically one-upping the NCRS in their demonization of Israel.

Essentially, the counter-petition proposes that Palestinian identity is not in conflict with Jordanian identity, for the simple fact that both stand in natural opposition to the “Zionist colonial project.” Moreover, the letter turns the NCRS petition on its head by arguing that attacking the citizenship rights of Palestinian-origin Jordanians only “weakens Jordan from the inside,” thus creating the very conditions for Israel to impose the alternative homeland solution. Rather, Obeidat’s letter stresses that the Kingdom must continue to,

"Ensure equal opportunities for all citizens without discrimination, protecting their legitimate rights and interests as guaranteed by the constitution."

What is striking, however, is that the counter-petition still levels heavy criticism at the regime for its stalled political reforms. What’s really behind the current political divisiveness in Jordan, maintain the authors, is a lack of commitment to comprehensive reform and the transition to democracy--a process they argue has been on the decline since 1993. The Palestinian issue is really a red herring. The absence of transparency in policies and legislation--and particularly an election law drafted behind closed doors with only the pretense of openness and inclusiveness--should be the real focus of concern for Jordanians.

Identity Politics and Foreign Policy

The regime’s challenge from the right also has implications for its freedom of action in the foreign policy arena. Arriving in Washington this week to support Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, King Abdullah risks losing even more political legitimacy at home by throwing his full weight behind the direct talks. His personal involvement comes at a time when Israel has alienated many Jordanians who once grudgingly welcomed the Kingdom’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel for its economic benefits.

It is no secret that King Abdullah has remained one of the most active ‘moderate Arab leaders’ in supporting a broad Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement throughout his reign and most recently through the framework of the Arab Peace Initiative. At a time when the Kingdom’s economic trajectory seems to be benefitting few outside of Palestinian business leaders and the regime’s political elite, however, the economic yields of the treaty are overshadowed by a rejectionist movement led by the strange alignment of the Islamist and Transjordanian camps.

The shift is long in the making. After a succession of aggressive Israeli foreign policy moves--including the 2006 war in southern Lebanon, the siege and then attack on Gaza in 2007-8, and the Turkish flotilla disaster earlier this year--many Jordanians have begun to call openly for abrogation of the treaty. Because the peace treaty is linked (both legally and conceptually) to the King and cabinet, both will continue to suffer collateral damage at home whenever there are reversals in the peace process--particularly from Transjordanian nationalists who perceive each failure in negotiations as a step closer to the much-feared “Jordan Option” (also known as the "alternative homeland" scenario, whereby large numbers of Palestinian refugees are forced to be permanently settled in the Kingdom due to a failure to enforce the 'right of return').

Crisis Management

Facing an unprecedented challenge from the right, with the specter of identity politics effecting everything from economic policies to support for the peace process and reinvigorating controversy over government corruption, how will the regime respond?

One potential outcome, as Jordan analyst Assaf David argues in Foreign Policy, is that the King may slowly drift to a much more adversarial stance towards Israel. Even as Abdullah continues to be an outspoken advocate for the peace process on the world stage and an active behind-the-scenes facilitator in the current round of negotiations, he will likely tack a hard line against Israel in his domestic political rhetoric:

"One possible scenario is that the regime will slowly drift towards adopting the lowest common denominator among the Transjordanian and Palestinian elite: Israel is the strategic threat for Jordan (the country, if not the regime)."

On many levels, this is already taking place. His public remarks in Jordan have been much more critical of both the US and Israel. And in a speech delivered just a month after publication of the petitions and commemorating the eleventh anniversary of his ascension to the throne, King Abdullah made a point to deal directly with persistent rumors of the ‘Jordan Option’:

(BBC)

"We will not accept, under any condition or in any form, any solution to the Palestinian question at Jordan’s expense...and Jordan will have no role in the West Bank. At the same time, we will not abandon our duty and historic role in supporting the Palestinians until they establish their independent state on their national soil. Any talk to the contrary is pressure exerted by external parties on Jordan because of its support for the Palestinian people."

Another potential response could be efforts by the regime to slow neoliberal economic reforms, include more East Bank voices in key appointed posts, and possibly even massage (manipulate?) the elections to ensure the continued dominance of rural and tribal elites in spite of cosmetic changes to the election law.

As influential blogger Naseem Tarawnah (The Black Iris of Jordan) notes, however, appeasement of the Transjordanian nationalist bloc may require more than these half measures:

"It may go without saying that these army men are destined to represent a growing problem for the state. They are not Islamists or fringe groups that the state can manipulate, buy off, marginalize, co-opt and essentially control - they are hardcore nationalists who have a history of putting country in front of anything else, even personal interest."